Connections: The Quarterly Journal

ISSN 1812-1098, e-ISSN 1812-2973

Nasirov, Iskandarov, and Sadiyev,

Connections QJ 16, no. 3 (2017): 47-56

https://doi.org/10.11610/Connections.16.3.03

Research Article

The South Caucasus: A Playground Between NATO

and Russia?

Elman Nasirov,a Khayal Iskandarov b and Sadi Sadiyev b

a Institute of Political Studies of the Academy of Public Administration under the

President of Azerbaijan

b War College of Armed Forces, Republic of Azerbaijan

Abstract: In this article, the challenges and prospects of cooperation be-

tween the South Caucasus countries and NATO have been analyzed. The

geo-economic, geopolitical and geostrategic importance of the region for

both NATO and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (Russia partic-

ularly) and reciprocal expectations of further cooperation with the Alliance

have been considered. The regional state of affairs in the South Caucasus

has been analyzed and the possible impacts of Russian influence on forging

closer relations with NATO have been examined. The security environment

after the Russo-Georgian war and its repercussions for the South Caucasus-

NATO cooperation have been illustrated. NATO’s vested interest in the re-

gion to contribute to a European security system for the foreseeable future

was brought to the fore. The reasons for the Alliance’s reluctance to ac-

tively engage in the region are examined. The recommendations are in-

tended to counterbalance the Russian military presence in the region,

without antagonizing the incumbent government in Moscow, and to erad-

icate the so-called “frozen conflicts” in order to maintain security and pros-

perity for the South Caucasus region as a whole.

Keywords: NATO, security, contribution, cooperation, frozen conflict,

membership, counterbalance.

Partnership for Peace Consortium of Defense

Creative Commons

Academies and Security Studies Institutes

BY-NC-SA 4.0

Nasirov, Iskandarov, and Sadiyev, Connections QJ 16, no. 3 (2017): 47-56

Introduction

In terms of its geopolitical and strategic importance, the South Caucasus has al-

ways been at the forefront of the foreign policy of global powers. While the re-

gion was once considered to be on the periphery of the international agenda,

after the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the subsequent formation of newly

independent states, it became much more important both to its neighbors and

to influential non-regional actors.1 Today the South Caucasus is a diverse geopo-

litical region, which occupies a strategic position in the transportation of Caspian

oil and gas. However, the region is challenged with unresolved conflicts and so-

cio-political and economic problems brought about by the collapse of the Soviet

Union.2 The protracted conflicts in the region have long been a source of tension

for both Georgia and Azerbaijan. Though NATO does not take a direct part in the

resolution of conflicts on the territory of a country outside the Alliance, the crises

in the South Caucasus are largely influenced by the relationship between NATO

and Russia.

The South Caucasus – A Venue for Contradicting Interests

After Bulgaria and Romania joined NATO in 2004 and then the European Union

in 2007, the South Caucasus began to be considered a new frontier for NATO and

the whole structure of European security.3 Apart from this, for NATO and its

members, the role of the South Caucasus is extremely important in terms of Eur-

asian security as well. Many European political scientists see the South Caucasus

as a center of economic interest and an important transportation corridor.4

Other factors have also fueled interest in the region. Foremost among these are

its natural resources (the Caspian basin) and the proximity of three major and

ambitious Eurasian states: Russia, Turkey and Iran. The region plays a crucial role

as a transport and energy corridor. Today Europe relies heavily on Russian oil

and natural gas. However, the EU is aiming to prevent Russia from wielding en-

ergy as a coercive tool and the Caspian basin has the utmost importance in this

policy.5 Thus, the Azerbaijan-Georgia-Turkey corridor is a critical strategic link

between Europe and Central Asia for challenging Russia’s current stranglehold

1 Sergey Markedonov, “NATO Looks to the Caucasus,” The National Interest, May 17,

2012, http://nationalinterest.org/ commentary/nato-looks-the-caucasus-6933.

2 Joshua Bartlett and Nino Samvelidze, “Turkey and the South Caucasus: Prospects and

Challenges

for

Cooperation,”

http://oval.az/turkey-and-the-south-caucasus-

prospects-and-challenges-for-cooperation/.

3 Markedonov, “NATO Looks to the Caucasus.”

4 Tamaz Papuashvili, “Georgia–NATO: Cooperation Prospects, ” http://gcssi.org/wp2/

?p=5139.

5 Eric S. Thompson, “Turkish Influence in the South Caucasus and Levant: The Conse-

quences for NATO and the EU,” (Monterey, California: Naval Postgraduate School,

September 2013), 37. http://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/37733/

13Sep_Thompson_Eric.pdf.

48

The South Caucasus: A Playground Between NATO and Russia?

on energy resources. This corridor includes the production and transportation of

hydrocarbons.

The paths of the three South Caucasus republics have been different in terms

of their geo-political orientations, with Armenia being a CSTO member, Azerbai-

jan pursuing an independent policy regarding global powers, and Georgia, ap-

parently, demonstrating a pro-NATO position. The lack of diplomatic relations

between Armenia and Azerbaijan due to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, Russia’s

increased assertiveness in the region and the absence of a NATO presence are

central elements in understanding the current situation in the region. What we

can gather from this situation is that the South Caucasus is a complex playground

between Russia and NATO.

Though NATO has a limited role, Russia is very much engaged in the region,

as recent and on-going conflicts illustrate, and has been exercising substantial

leverage and influence for a considerable time. After the collapse of the Soviet

Union, Russia has been intent on dominating the post-soviet countries and de-

clared this strategy as a priority for its foreign policy. Russia’s presence in the

region is extensive, including its military participation in Armenia and Georgia’s

breakaway entities. Nevertheless, the way common interests might be trans-

lated into joint opportunities depends not only on Russia’s policy towards the

South Caucasus, but also on how Russia-NATO relations evolve. That is why the

national security interests and foreign policy goals of these states must be part

of the bargaining process, despite their position regarding Russia and NATO.6

The crucial point in formulating NATO’s future engagement in the region is

that membership of NATO is not an issue. NATO’s broad variety of programs

serve to transform the regional security picture overall – with or without mem-

bership. The Partnership for Peace (PfP) program is an invaluable tool in building

political and military bridges between NATO members and partner nations.7 It

increases security in the region and contributes to its political, social and eco-

nomic development. Through its activities, PfP has proved to be a very successful

mechanism in promoting and developing defense cooperation and military in-

teroperability between NATO and the South Caucasus countries. But the extent

and depth of cooperation with Azerbaijan and Georgia is of a different order than

that with Armenia. From 2003, when Mikheil Saakashvilli came to power, Geor-

gia consistently declared that it was pursuing NATO membership until August

2008, when the Russian army invaded its territory. As a corollary to that invasion

Georgia has become more prudent in its relations with Russia. A long period of

time has elapsed since that invasion, and Georgia is no longer as close to NATO

6 Maria Raquel Freire, “Security in the South Caucasus: the EU, NATO and Russia,”

NOREF Policy Brief (Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre, February 2013),

accessed June 4, 2017, https://noref.no/Publications/Themes/Emerging-powers/

Security-in-the-South-Caucasus-the-EU-NATO-and-Russia.

7 Nika Chitadze, “NATO: One of the Main Guarantees of Peace and Security in South

Caucasus,” in Perceptions of NATO and the New Strategic Concept, ed. Luis Nuno Ro-

drigues and Volodymyr Dubovyk (Amsterdam: IOS Press, 2011), 61-73.

49

Nasirov, Iskandarov, and Sadiyev, Connections QJ 16, no. 3 (2017): 47-56

membership as it was before the August war though it still has a strong presence

in NATO operations and solid credentials in meeting the Alliance’s military and

political standards. In fact, Russia has demonstrated its continued presence in

the region through its military actions in Georgia. This signal was immediately

and accurately read by a careful Azerbaijan, which, thereafter, strengthened the

multi-vector nature of its foreign policy amidst the region’s geopolitical rivalries

and joined the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) in 2011.8 By joining NAM Azerbai-

jan has declared that it is not seeking membership of either NATO or CSTO at the

moment. However, the Republic of Azerbaijan with its growing international

prestige attaches great importance to the development of relations with NATO.

Today, international authorities highly appreciate the steps taken by Azerbaijan

in ensuring regional and global security and safeguarding its interests on recip-

rocal bases.9 Though it has no direct intention to join NATO, Azerbaijan is

deemed NATO’s most reliable partner in the region. This was recognized by the

Assistant Secretary General of NATO Sorin Ducaru speaking at the conference

marking the 20th anniversary of program “Partnership for Peace” on April 11,

2014 when he said, “Azerbaijan is one of the most important, active and long-

term partners of NATO. We are actively developing a political dialogue with

Baku.”10 As NATO’s reliable partner, Azerbaijan’s cooperation with the Alliance

extends to many areas including the fight against terrorism, regional security,

contribution to international security and, in particular, Azerbaijan’s support for

NATO operations. In this regard, Azerbaijan aspires to achieve NATO military

standards and get closer to its military institutions. NATO’s political priorities and

security interests chime with Azerbaijan’s national interests and further im-

provements in multilateral relations is the main guarantor of peace and security

in the region.

The arguments in favor of continuing South Caucasus-NATO relations can be

grouped as follows:

• It increases confidence in the security of the South Caucasus region

• It ensures the security of oil and gas production and transportation

• The most important problems in the region—the so called “frozen con-

flicts”—might be solved by peaceful means

• Armed Forces become interoperable with NATO Forces.

If the South Caucasus-NATO cooperation acts as a guarantor of the region’s

security, then the nature of all possible threats should be analyzed. So, what

8 Cavid Veliyev, “Can Trump Shake Up the South Caucasus?” The National Interest, De-

cember 18, 2016, http://nationalinterest.org/feature/can-trump-shake-the-south-

caucasus-18774.

9 Əhmədov T. “Azərbaycan-NATO əlaqələri genişlənir,” Respublika qəzeti, Bakı, fevral

26, 2012, № 046, s.1.

10 Khayal Iskandarov, “The Road of Integration of Azerbaijan into NATO (1994-2014),”

The Caucasus and the World 19 (2015): 89.

50

The South Caucasus: A Playground Between NATO and Russia?

threats are there in the region? In the current socio-political climate, the obvious

threats are most probably from those countries with which NATO’s economic

and political interests contradict. Thus, in order to understand the nature of

these threats, it is necessary to determine the areas of conflicting interests. The

first and foremost of these is the Caspian oil and gas fields. In this domain NATO’s

interests clash seriously with Russian interests and the latter has been using the

“frozen conflicts” for decades in order to keep the region and its oil and gas in-

frastructure of the country under threat. In fact, these conflicts, interspersed

with numerous asymmetrical threats in the region, present a challenging envi-

ronment on NATO’s eastern front. Russia is playing a dual game in the South

Caucasus at the same time both stabilizing and destabilizing the region. On the

one hand, there is Russia the conflict-mediator, the one that brokers ceasefires

and seeks to resolve the South Caucasian conflicts via its mandate as co-chair of

the Minsk Group of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. On

the other hand, there is Russia the provoker. Having already provoked its own

war with Georgia in 2008, Russia recognized two of the Georgia’s breakaway re-

gions as independent states and is still militarily present in their territories.11

Russia also supports Armenia, which has occupied 20percent of Azerbaijan’s ter-

ritory, both economically and militarily.

Today Russia accuses NATO of destabilizing the Caucasus region with joint

exercises in Georgia, but itself has stationed permanent military bases in Arme-

nia, as well as in the separatist regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Embold-

ened by Russian support, Armenia still keeps Nagorno-Karabakh under its occu-

pation. However, the West does not have an effective political or military tool to

balance Russia’s military presence in Armenia. The unbalanced and overwhelm-

ing Russian military presence in Armenia creates a serious and direct threat to

Western oil and gas infrastructures and pipelines.12 Yet, Russia has been using

its role as a mediator for advancing its own interests rather than the actual con-

flict resolution. As long as the three South Caucasus states are divided, Russia can rule them. It is not a secret that South Caucasus conflicts serve Russia as

political leverage over Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan. In a nutshell, Russia has

been applying a divide and rule policy through protracted conflicts. Indeed, the

current status quo is clearly beneficial to Russia’s interests, preserving an eco-

nomic and military sphere of influence while preventing any of the South Cauca-

sian states from looking towards NATO.

11 Tatia Dolidze, “Russian and Western engagement in the South Caucasus conflicts: Building sustainable stability in the region?” December 2, 2015.

12 Mahir Khalifazadeh, “The South Caucasus: Obama’s Russia ‘Reset’ and Putin’s Doc-

trine,” CESRAN International, July 27, 2014, http://cesran.org/the-south-caucasus-

obamas-russia-reset-and-putins-doctrine.html.

51

Nasirov, Iskandarov, and Sadiyev, Connections QJ 16, no. 3 (2017): 47-56

NATO’s Raison d’être of Further Engagement in the Region

NATO attaches considerable importance to the Caucasus region and so it is con-

cerned by the escalation of tensions in the area. All three countries are in Eu-

rope’s Eastern Partnership and the security in its neighborhood is one of NATO’s

core interests. However, due to a number reasons there has been less effort

from NATO to actively contribute to security in the South Caucasus. Indeed,

NATO lacks coherence in its policy towards South Caucasus. First and foremost,

the Alliance is careful not to anger Russia. The Russian-Georgian war and the

Ukraine crisis have made the West more reluctant to intervene and so expansion

into the South Caucasus is not expected to be on NATO’s agenda in the foresee-

able future. However, we can assume that NATO can counterbalance Russia and

facilitate the overall integration of the region into NATO institutions through its

partnership programs. While talking about the prospects of cooperation be-

tween the South Caucasus countries and NATO, various regional factors have to

be kept in mind. At the 2008 Bucharest summit, Russian President Vladimir Putin

declared that he regarded the existence of a powerful military alliance on its near

borders as a direct threat to Russia’s national security and national interests.13

In addition, he made the following remarks on Georgia and Ukraine:

It [the Georgian conflict] is an old, many-years, lasting for more than a

hundred years ethnic conflict between Georgians, … Abkhazians, … Osse-

tians. … To solve these problems they need not to enter NATO, they

should have patience, establish dialog with small ethnic groups. And we

have been trying to help them. … But in Ukraine, one third are ethnic Rus-

sians. Out of forty-five million people, in line with the official census, sev-

enteen million are Russians. There are regions, where only the Russian

population lives, for instance, in the Crimea 90 % are Russians. … Well,

seventeen million Russians currently live in Ukraine. Who may state that

we do not have any interests there? 14

Consequently, though President Bush strongly supported Ukraine and Geor-

gia becoming NATO MAP (Membership Action Plan) members, the United King-

dom, France and Germany opposed the idea. The British judgment is that, alt-

hough they fully supported both Ukraine and Georgia, the question of when they

joined should remain in the balance. Germany and France said they believed that

since neither Ukraine nor Georgia was stable enough to enter the program then,

13 Nəzakət Məmmədova, “NATO: Şimali Atlantikadan Şərqi Avropaya doğru,” Xalq qəzeti

81, aprel 18, 2008, s.5.

14 “Text of Putin’s speech at NATO Summit,” UNIAN (Bucharest, April 2, 2008) ,

http://www.unian.info/world/111033-text-of-putins-speech-at-nato-summit-

bucharest-april-2-2008.html.

52

The South Caucasus: A Playground Between NATO and Russia?

a membership plan would be an unnecessary offense to Russia.15 Germany is still

skeptical, fearing that Georgian accession will drag the Atlantic Alliance into a

confrontation with Russia. Thus, even if it is temporary, Russia has managed, for

the foreseeable future, to prevent any NATO expansion towards the 2008 post-

soviet borders because Russian military intervention remains a credible threat

to all post-soviet countries in its proximity.

NATO may be the sine qua non for security in the South Caucasus. But, it does

not mean that the South Caucasus countries have to be full members. The most

promising and perhaps single means of redressing the “security deficit” in the

South Caucasus is through the gradual extension of NATO programs into the re-

gion. Regional states, including Armenia, are now gradually realizing that their

relations with NATO are in fact concerned with how to select, develop, and in-

corporate NATO programs that will, increasingly over time, transform the overall

regional security picture.16

Whilst new global risks emerge, the security domain enlarges towards unu-

sual security issues, which require a fast adaptation of traditional institutions,

enlarging their responsibilities, tasks and sometimes also the tools at their dis-

posal. Energy security is the main concern among those issues. Nowadays energy

has been more politicized, becoming an effective weapon for coercion and cre-

ating irreconcilable differences between energy owners and consumers. Since

NATO admits that energy security is quickly becoming a growing concern for Eu-

ropean security and will be one of the most important future challenges for Al-

lies, the significance of the South Caucasus has increased considerably. As a re-

sult of the political friction in the energy relationship between the EU and Russia

in spring 2006, and later between Russia and Ukraine in January 2009, member

states have called for NATO involvement in energy security.17 But, the lack of a

consensus among members has not allowed NATO to have a wider involvement

in energy security. Other institutions, such as the EU, may have a key role to play

and are more suited to resolving the major problems of investment and effi-

ciency. But, NATO could still make a positive contribution to the energy security

of its members and indeed more globally. Moreover, a lack of clarity about

NATO’s role and the reasons behind it, particularly in terms of its geographical

role, could complicate NATO’s relations with partner countries and other third

parties (Russia in this case). The importance of ensuring energy security once

again was underscored and endorsed by Allies in November 2010. The 13th par-

agraph of NATO Strategic Concept recognized the increased dependence of

15 Steven Erlanger and Steven Lee Myers, “NATO Allies Oppose Bush on Georgia and Ukraine,” New York Times, April 3, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/03/

world/europe/03nato.html.

16 Chitadze, “NATO: One of the Main Guarantees.”

17 Chitadze, “NATO: One of the Main Guarantees.”

53

Nasirov, Iskandarov, and Sadiyev, Connections QJ 16, no. 3 (2017): 47-56

states on “vital communication, transport and transit routes on which energy

security, international trade and prosperity depends.”18

The main obstacles to a pivotal role for NATO in energy security within the

Caspian region are19:

• A lack of means and tools at NATO’s disposal, which impedes attempts

to implement the intentions expressed in NATO’s Strategic Concept

• Russia’s reluctance to engage in a joint effort with NATO. Any action that

the Alliance would implement, especially involving the military, could

give rise to a Russian reaction to counterbalance the Euro-Atlantic pres-

ence in such a vital region of its national interest

• Discord within NATO for a greater NATO commitment to energy security

• Weak cooperation on energy security with Caspian partners.

However, the ever-increasing need for the diversification of energy sources

and cooperation in energy transit issues has, perhaps, made the West attach a

great deal of importance to the South Caucasus region (Azerbaijan-Georgia-Tur-

key corridor) as a reliable transit route avoiding Russian and Iranian territories.

The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline and Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum natural gas pipe-

line represent a step forward in this cooperation, especially combined with the

upcoming TANAP and TAP projects.20 The further development of the Caspian

region will have a considerable impact on the strategic balance in the world pro-

viding the key to access Central Asian resources. South Caucasus’ role in ensuring

the energy security of Europe is also welcomed by the U.S. The White House

strongly supports the Azerbaijan-initiated Southern Gas Corridor project, which

will carry the “Shah Deniz II” gas to European consumers. John Kerry said that

“this project was a very important step with respect to Europe’s long-term stra-

tegic interests and frankly, to try to diversify the sourcing of energy, which is

important.”21 As a result of this policy the existing tools and efforts for new ini-

tiatives towards the diversification of energy supply will improve Europe’s en-

ergy security and the security of the Alliance as a whole. NATO’s role here is to

add value to EU energy security policy and to pave the way towards energy se-

curity.

18 Opening speech by H.E. Mr. Daniel Cristian Ciobanu, Ambassador of Romania to Azer-

baijan, International workshop ensuring energy security in the Caspian basin and

NATO’s role in protecting critical energy infrastructure, Baku, November 22, 2012.

19 Aurora Ganz, “Energy Security Issues: Is NATO Becoming a (Pivotal) Actor?” Sciences-

Po, Centre de Recherches Internationales, September 2014, accessed June 4, 2017,

http://www.sciencespo.fr/ceri/fr/content/dossiersduceri/energy-security-issues-

nato-becoming-pivotal-actor.

20 Bartlett and Samvelidze, “Turkey and the South Caucasus.”

21 Aynur Karimova, “Kerry appraises Azerbaijan’s role in international security system,”

AZERNEWS, March 31, 2016, accessed January 18, 2018, http://www.azernews.az/

nation/94480.html.

54

The South Caucasus: A Playground Between NATO and Russia?

Considering the strategic nature of the region, NATO should keep a close eye

on developments in the South Caucasus, both politically and economically. In

addition, Russia has shown that it uses the frozen conflicts and energy as tools

in order to push NATO away from its borders and to weaken its cohesion. If we

consider all non-NATO countries on the European periphery of Russia we would

see that only Finland, Sweden and Belarus do not have any conflicts in their ter-

ritories. The first two are neutral countries and the latter is a CSTO member.

What we can deduce from this is that NATO membership for aspiring countries

has become illusory, even wishful thinking for the foreseeable future. However,

it does not mean that NATO should stay on the sidelines on the issue of the con-

flicts, because their continued existence is an important concern for overall Eu-

ropean security.22

Conclusion

Russia will pull out all the stops in order to exert its influence in its “near abroad”

and reassert itself as a dominant power as it has in the post-soviet space. The

South Caucasus, with its proximity to Russia, occupies the first place in this “near

abroad.” The only way for South Caucasus countries (Georgia and Azerbaijan) to

eradicate their problems regarding frozen conflicts is to strike the right balance

between NATO and Russia, because the latter does not seem to want to give up

its political ambitions in the region. But cooperation with NATO has the utmost

importance for all three countries. That is why, since Armenia is a CSTO country,

Georgia and Azerbaijan should follow the examples of Sweden and Finland to

enhance further cooperation with NATO. The Alliance could increase Azerbai-

jani-Georgian military cooperation to encourage peace and stability in the South

Caucasus through active partnership relations without actual membership of

NATO. This is because every move that any South Caucasus country makes to-

wards NATO membership might prompt a negative reaction from Russia. Subse-

quently, as it did during the Russo-Georgian war in 2008, NATO will be reluctant

to respond to any Russian action. Thus, close practical, rather than political, co-

operation with NATO will improve both Azerbaijan’s and Georgia’s defense ca-

pabilities in a similar way to Sweden and Finland. This kind of strategy could re-

duce any on-going tension between Russia and the West and may partially bal-

ance Russia’s military presence in Armenia and in Georgia’s breakaway regions.

Europe is vulnerable to energy coercion and the Azerbaijan-Georgia-Turkey

tandem offers it the best option to withstand this coercion. Maintaining security

in the region is in the interest of energy-importing, transit and energy-exporting

countries, which need to ensure the security of their industry and pipeline infra-

structure. That is why the South Caucasus region has to be considered as a buffer

zone between NATO and Russia until the “frozen conflicts” are settled and all

22 Xavier Follebouckt, “The South Caucasus’s Still Frozen Conflicts,” Atlantic Voices 6,

no. 7 (July 2016), http://atahq.org/2016/07/atlantic-voices-south-caucasus/.

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Nasirov, Iskandarov, and Sadiyev, Connections QJ 16, no. 3 (2017): 47-56

energy projects are implemented. But choosing only one side can only exacer-

bate the existing crises for Georgia and Azerbaijan in their territories.

About the Authors

Prof. Elman Nasirov is Doctor in political sciences and Director of the Institute of

Political Studies of the Academy of Public Administration under the President of

Azerbaijan. He serves also as member of parliament of the Republic of Azer-

baijan.

Khayal Iskandarov is Chief of the editorial section of the War College of the

Armed Forces, Republic of Azerbaijan. He holds a Master degree in military

sciences and is currently pursuing a PhD degree in military sciences and national

security. E-mail: xayal1333@gmail.com.

Sadi Sadiyev, PhD in philology, is Associate professor in the War College of the

Armed Forces, Republic of Azerbaijan. E-mail: sanansadiyev@yahoo.co.uk.

56

Document Outline

- Introduction

- The South Caucasus – A Venue for Contradicting Interests

- NATO’s Raison d’être of Further Engagement in the Region

- Conclusion

- About the Authors

Table of Contents

Introduction

The South Caucasus – A Venue for Contradicting Interests

NATO’s Raison d’être of Further Engagement in the Region

Conclusion

About the Authors